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The Evolution of Debt Policies: 
New Evidence from Business Startups 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies over a period of 15 years after 
startup, considering leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity. Our analysis 
is based on a unique sample covering all non-financial Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 
1998. We find that the debt policy of entrepreneurial firms is remarkably stable over time. The 
debt policy in the initial year of operation is a very important determinant of future debt policies, 
even after controlling for traditional contemporaneous determinants. The founder-CEO has an 
important impact on the stability of debt policies: the influence of initial debt policies on future 
debt policies is significantly reduced when the founder-CEO is replaced or when (s)he dies. 
Combined, our findings support imprinting theory. 
 
JEL classification: G32 
Keywords: capital structure, debt structure, entrepreneurial firms, founder-CEOs 
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1. Introduction 
A number of studies have found that over time, the leverage ratio of listed firms (Lemmon, 
Roberts and Zender, 2008; Welch, 2004; Wu and Yeung, 2012) and established private firms 
(Hanousek and Shamshur, 2011) contains an important stable component. If past leverage ratios 
have possible bearing on future leverage ratios, a logical place to start a study of the evolution of 
leverage is the earliest phase of a firm’s existence, i.e., its founding. However, while startups rely 
on debt financing to a greater extent than often recognized (Cassar, 2004; Cumming, 2005; Robb 
and Robinson, 2014), no study has yet examined the evolution of leverage in early-stage firms. 
Moreover, we lack evidence as to whether findings on the dynamics of leverage have 
implications for a broader range of debt policies, including debt specialization (Colla, Ippolito 
and Li, 2013), debt maturity (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001) and debt granularity (Choi, Hackbarth 
and Zechner, 2014). In sum, an investigation of the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt 
policies going back to startup is timely. 
How the debt policies of entrepreneurial firms evolve over time remains ambiguous from a 
theoretical perspective. On the one hand, information-based theories on the evolution of 
entrepreneurial financing predict that debt policies will change as firms age because firms reveal 
more information to the market and establish relationships with private debt providers (Berger 
and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 2002). For instance, Berger and Udell (1998) state 
that ―different capital structures are optimal‖ (p. 613) and different ―sources of finance become 
important at different points in the financial growth cycle‖ (p. 622). This view thus suggests that 
firms’ debt policies at startup may have little bearing on their future debt policies. On the other 
hand, imprinting theory (Boeker, 1989; Stinchcombe, 1965)―which had its roots in the 
management literature but is also used in economics and finance research (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003; Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000)―suggests that (a) conditions at the time of founding define 
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initial policies and create internal consensus around the initial policies of the firm, and (b) 
conditions subsequent to founding tend to preserve previously adopted policies. Imprinting 
theory thus suggests that firms’ debt policies at startup have significant bearing on their future 
debt policies. 
Consistent with imprinting theory, corporate finance research shows how CEOs ―imprint 
their mark‖ on firms’ financial policies, regardless of whether it is optimal (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003, p. 1175). Schoar and Zuo (2014), for instance, show how CEOs with recession experience 
display more conservative styles in their future career, including holding lower leverage ratios. 
We therefore consider the influence of founder-CEOs on the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ 
debt policies. We expect that firms’ initial debt policies will exert less influence on future debt 
policies after the departure of the founder-CEO because entrepreneurial firms may break out of 
their initial path when new CEOs are appointed. Alternatively, founder-CEO departures may be a 
consequence of the need for financial reorganization. Using unique data on founder-CEO 
deaths—exogenous CEO departures unrelated to the need for financial reorganization (or any 
other unmeasured variable)—we can tease out these alternative explanations. 
Scholars have been severely constrained in their efforts to study the evolution of 
entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies from founding because the data required for such an 
investigation are generally not available (Robb and Robinson, 2014). Belgium, however, 
represents a unique ―laboratory‖ to study the evolution of firms’ debt policies because all non-
financial firms, including startups, have a legal obligation to annually file detailed financial 
accounts with the Belgian National Bank. Consequently, we are able to construct a unique 
database from the population of non-financial firms founded between 1996 and 1998, for which 
we have detailed financial information for as long as 15 years after startup (i.e., until 2013). 
Moreover, firms are required to provide detailed information concerning their founding, capital 
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increases, appointments and resignations and the like in the Belgian Law Gazette, and this 
information is externally validated by a notary. The Belgian Law Gazette provides unique 
information about the departure of founder-CEOs in early-stage entrepreneurial firms.  
We find that leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity policies in the 
initial year of operation are statistically and economically significant determinants of future debt 
policies—even after controlling for traditional contemporaneous determinants. Moreover, 
variance decomposition analyses show that the variation captured by models that include 
traditional capital and debt structure determinants is substantially lower than the variation 
captured by models that only include firm fixed effects. This finding implies that time-invariant 
and unobservable firm-specific factors present at startup drive the debt policies of entrepreneurial 
firms to a large extent. We highlight one factor: the founder-CEO. We find that the influence of 
initial debt policies on entrepreneurial firms’ future debt policies significantly declines after the 
departure of founder-CEOs. To address potential endogeneity of new CEO appointments, we 
investigate how the death of the founder-CEO affects the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt 
policies. The results indicate that the impact of initial debt policies of entrepreneurial firms on 
their future debt policies significantly declines after the death of founder-CEOs.  
Our study contributes to the finance literature in several ways. First, extant research focuses 
on cross-sectional heterogeneity in the capital structure of entrepreneurial firms by relying on 
cross-sectional survey data (Cassar, 2004; Cosh, Cumming and Hughes, 2009) or on 
comparatively short time series of financial data (Robb and Robinson, 2014). We provide unique 
evidence on the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies in the 15 years after founding. 
Second, while an increasing body of research shows the importance of debt financing for new 
entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Robb and Robinson, 2014), research has only skimmed the surface in 
terms of exploring the ways new entrepreneurial firms rely on debt financing (Robinson, 2012). 
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We provide first-time evidence on debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity choices 
and their dynamics in very early stage firms. Third, we also contribute to the literature by 
investigating the effect of founder-CEOs on firm policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). 
While several studies have examined the impact of a CEO and of CEO departures on firm 
policies, especially in large public firms (e.g., Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011; Fee, Hadlock 
and Pierce, 2013), to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine the impact of 
founder-CEO departures (and deaths) on the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies. 
Finally, our study has important ramifications for capital structure theory. New 
entrepreneurial firms are arguably the most informationally opaque firms (Berger and Udell, 
1998). Consequently, we would expect the pecking order theory to be especially relevant in our 
context because this theory states that the existence of information asymmetry leads to a 
financing hierarchy. However, the stable component of capital structure cannot be explained by 
the pecking order theory (Dennis, 2012). Moreover, the static trade-off theory is also unable to 
explain the stable component of the debt policies because this theory predicts that the financial 
structure will be rebalanced when it deviates too much from its target (Lambrecht and Myers, 
2014). While scholars have used dynamic models to explain the stable component of financial 
policies in mature public firms by incorporating manager-shareholder agency conflicts 
(Lambrecht and Myers, 2014; Morellec, Nikolov and Schürhoff, 2012), such models are less 
suitable for new entrepreneurial firms, in which principal and agents are likely to be the same 
individuals (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, the observed stable component of debt policies in 
entrepreneurial firms is in line with imprinting theory, which argues that important predictors of 
firms’ current financing policies are their financing policies at founding.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the research setting. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses possible 
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alternative explanations for the findings as well as several extended analyses on subsamples. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Research setting 
Belgium is a typical example of a Continental European, bank-based financial system in which 
banks play a central role in mobilizing savings and allocating capital (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 1999). While the Belgian banking sector is well developed, public equity and debt 
markets play only a minor role in corporate financing. As in other Continental European 
countries, few firms are quoted on a stock exchange and initial public offerings are rare events. 
Public debt markets are only accessible for large and mature firms, which are not the focus of this 
study. The venture capital and private equity market is quite developed in Belgium, compared to 
other Continental European venture capital and private equity markets (Groh, Liechtenstein and 
Lieser, 2010)—although less developed than the U.S. and U.K. markets.  
During the timeframe of our paper, several important events occurred that may have had a 
significant impact on the financing of Belgian firms. First, in the period 1997-2003, Belgium 
experienced a significant wave of bank mergers (e.g., Degryse, Masschelein and Mitchell, 2011), 
resulting in a heavily concentrated credit market in which four banks provide nearly 80% of total 
outstanding credit. Second, in 2005 the Belgian government introduced a new tax measure 
(which was effective from 2006) to reduce the tax advantage of debt financing (e.g., Panier, 
Pérez-González and Villanueva, 2013). The ―notional interest deduction‖ allows firms subject to 
Belgian corporate taxes to deduct from their taxable income an amount equal to the interest they 
would have paid on their ―corrected‖ equity capital if that capital were to be viewed as long-term 
debt financing. Third, the financial crisis had a negative impact on the Belgian banks. After the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, Fortis Bank―the largest Belgian bank―had to be bailed 
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out by the Belgian, Luxembourg, and Dutch governments. Subsequently, the other three major 
Belgian banks had to be rescued by the government. A survey conducted by the Belgian National 
Bank shows that this led to a net tightening in credit volume, general credit conditions, costs and 
required collateral for firms.
1
 
The occurrence of these events over the timeframe of our study should bias our results 
against finding stable debt policies. However, despite this bias, we find evidence that the debt 
policies of entrepreneurial firms in their initial year of operation are important determinants of 
future debt policies. Before presenting our results in detail, we first discuss our data. 
 
3. Method  
3.1. Sample  
The data for this paper are from the Bel-first database. The Bel-first database is compiled by 
Bureau van Dijk (BvD), one of Europe’s leading electronic publishers of business information. 
Reporting requirements imposed by the Belgian government require all non-financial firms—
irrespective of their size and age—to annually file detailed financial accounts in a predefined 
format with the Belgian National Bank.
2
 When the financial accounts are filed with the Belgian 
National Bank, they are processed and checked and subsequently made available to the public. 
BvD collects these data to compile the Bel-first database. Typically, one annual release of Bel-
first covers at most the preceding ten accounting years of each firm. BvD removes firms after at 
least five years of no reporting data. Therefore, to eliminate this potential survivorship bias, we 
                                                          
1
 More information on the survey is available at: http://www.nbb.be/DOC/DQ/kredObs/fr/data/KO_tarifs.htm. 
2
 Belgian SMEs are allowed to report abbreviated financial statements when they comply with the following 
requirements. A firm should (1) employ less than 100 employees on average per year registered or (2) not meet two 
or more of the following criteria: (i) annual turnover > 6,250,000 euro, (ii) balance sheet total > 3,125,000 euro and 
(iii) average number of employees > 50. One major difference between abbreviated and complete financial 
statements is that revenues only have to be disclosed in complete financial statements. However, even the 
abbreviated statements provide 25 pages of financial information. 
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compile the database by collecting accounting information from each annual release 
retrospectively so that we can have the complete history of data for all firms in our sample across 
the entire sample period. 
Firms had to fulfill several criteria to be part of our sample. First, we include all limited 
liability firms that were legally incorporated in 1996, 1997 or 1998. We select firms founded in 
multiple years to avoid that idiosyncratic events in a specific founding year would drive our 
results.
3
 To do so, we start from the oldest Bel-first release that is available (the February 1998 
release). We use subsequent Bel-first releases to collect data for these firms until the year 2013. 
Second, firms should have at least 1 employee and less than 50 employees, measured in full-time 
equivalents, in the year of startup. We use this selection criterion to exclude ―ghost‖ firms (i.e., 
firms that only exist on paper, primarily for fiscal reasons) and firms that are unlikely to be de 
novo startups. Third, we only include independent startups because firms that belong to a group 
structure may have limited discretion over their debt policies. Firms could not be controlled by an 
external shareholder with an equity stake of 50% or more (except for equity stakes of families, 
employees and directors) and could not have participations in other firms (ownership > 10%) at 
startup. Fourth, we exclude financial and government-owned firms because the financing of these 
firms may be influenced by regulatory issues. Fifth, we only select firm-year observations for 
which all information needed to calculate our variables is available. It is important to note that 
our sample not only includes firms that are active in all sample years but also firms that leave the 
sample over the sample period either due to bankruptcy, acquisitions or buy-outs. 
The final sample contains 49,418 firm-year observations, which represent 4,962 firms. Of 
these 4,962 firms, 2,347 firms are active during all sample years, while 2,615 firms leave the 
sample either due to bankruptcy, acquisitions or buy-outs. 
                                                          
3
 Results on each individual founding year are qualitatively similar to those reported below for the full sample. 
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The financial data from the Bel-first database are supplemented with information about the 
departure of founder-CEOs and founder-CEO deaths. This information was, for each of the 4,962 
firms, manually collected using the Belgian Law Gazette. In the Belgian Law Gazette, Belgian 
firms are required to provide detailed information concerning their founding, capital increases, 
appointments and resignations and the like, and this official information is externally validated by 
a notary. Of the 4,962 firms, there are 1,907 firms in which the founder-CEO leaves the firm in 
the first 15 years after startup, and there are 19 firms in which a new CEO is appointed after the 
death of the founder-CEO.  
  
3.2. Variables 
We focus on four dependent variables, capturing distinct aspects of firms’ debt policies. First, we 
examine the extent to which a firm’s capital structure consists of debt financing by using a firm’s 
leverage ratio. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt on total assets (e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995).
4
 Second, we explore the extent to which the debt financing in a firm’s capital 
structure belongs to one type of debt or to a more diversified range of debt sources. Therefore, 
debt specialization is computed using a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of debt 
usage following a similar procedure as described by Colla et al. (2013). Specifically, we first 
calculate: 
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with       the sum of the squared debt type ratios for firm i in year t; ID, BD, NBD, TD and OOD 
refer to insider debt, bank debt, non-bank debt (including debt related to payroll or social 
                                                          
4
 We also use the ratio of bank debt to total assets, and the results remain qualitatively similar. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of different leverage measures. 
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security, taxes), trade debt and other operational debt, respectively; D refers to total debt. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of debt usage is subsequently computed as: 
 
      
          
     
            
 
HHI equals one when a firm exclusively uses one type of debt, while HHI equals zero when a 
firm simultaneously uses all five types of debt in equal proportion. The higher the HHI, the 
higher is the degree of debt specialization.
5
 Third, we examine the maturity structure of firm debt. 
Debt maturity is measured as the percentage of total debt that matures in more than five years 
(Custodio, Ferreira and Laureano, 2013).
6
 Finally, debt granularity is used to measure the extent 
to which a firm spreads out its debt maturity dates (Choi et al., 2014) and is computed following 
a similar procedure as for debt specialization. Specifically, we first calculate:  
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with       the sum of the squared debt maturity ratios for firm i in year t; D<1, D1-5 and D>5 
refer to the amount of debt that matures in one year, the amount of debt that matures between one 
and five years and the amount of debt that matures in more than five years, respectively; D refers 
to total debt. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of debt maturity is subsequently computed 
as: 
 
      
          
     
            
                                                          
5
 We also use a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm obtains at least 90% of its debt from one debt type and 
zero otherwise, as an alternative measure of debt specialization (e.g., Colla et al., 2013). Results remain qualitatively 
similar when using this alternative debt specialization measure. 
6
 Due to data availability, we could only make a distinction between debt that matures in more than five years, debt 
that matures between one and five years and debt that matures in one year. In line with Scherr and Hulburt (2001), 
we therefore also measure debt maturity as the percentage of debt that matures in more than one year. Results remain 
qualitatively similar when using this alternative debt maturity measure. 
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HHI is equal to one when a firm does not spread out its debt maturity dates, while HHI equals 
zero when a firm completely spreads out its debt maturity dates. We multiply this measure with -
1 so that higher values of debt granularity indicate that firms increasingly spread out their debt 
maturity dates.
7
  
The initial values (i.e., the values at startup) of these four distinct aspects of firms’ debt 
policies are our key independent variables. We further construct a dummy variable founder-CEO 
departure and its interaction with initial debt policies to capture the influence of the departure of 
founder-CEOs on the relationship between entrepreneurial firms’ initial debt policies and their 
subsequent debt policies. Founder-CEO departure equals 1 from the year of the founder-CEO 
departure onward and 0 otherwise.
8
 We also use a dummy variable founder-CEO death and its 
interaction with initial debt policies to examine the impact of exogenous founder-CEO departures 
on the relationship between entrepreneurial firms’ initial debt policies and their subsequent debt 
policies. Founder-CEO death equals 1 from the year of the founder-CEO death onward and 0 
otherwise. 
Several control variables that are consistently shown in prior research to be important capital 
structure and debt structure determinants are included in our analyses, including firm size, 
profitability, tangibility and growth opportunities (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Brav, 2009; Colla et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2014). Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is measured as the amount of earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets. Tangibility is measured as the ratio of net property, plant 
                                                          
7
 In contrast to Choi et al. (2014), we do not take the inverse of the HHI but rather multiply the HHI with -1 because 
we otherwise lose data (i.e., those firms that completely spread out their debt maturity dates). 
8
 The available information does not allow us to consider whether the founder-CEO remains a shareholder after (s)he 
ceases to be the CEO. The fact that we cannot take this into account provides a bias against finding any significant 
effect of founder-CEO departure, as the founder can still exert influence on the firms’ policies if (s)he remains a 
shareholder. 
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and equipment to total assets. Firm growth is measured as the relative growth in total assets (i.e., 
total assets of the firm in year t minus total assets in year t-1, and this is divided by total assets in 
year t-1). We further include the capital expenditures of firms by measuring the amount of new 
investments in fixed assets on total assets as an additional proxy for firm growth opportunities 
(e.g., Brav, 2009). 
The creditworthiness of firms is often proxied by ratings given by agencies such as Standard 
& Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings. The firms in our sample, however, lack such ratings. 
Therefore, we use the (unlevered) FiTo score, which is a default risk indicator from Graydon. 
Graydon is the market leader in commercial and marketing information as well as credit and debt 
management in Belgium. The FiTo score takes values between 0 (financially distressed firms) 
and 1 (financially healthy firms). The firm-year observations are divided into three categories 
according to their FiTo score by using dummy variables. Dummy low creditworthiness is a 
dummy variable that is 1 for the bottom 25% of firm-year observations and zero otherwise (low 
creditworthiness). Dummy medium creditworthiness is a dummy variable that is 1 for the firm-
year observations with a FiTo score between the 25th and 75th percentile and zero otherwise 
(medium creditworthiness). Finally, dummy high creditworthiness is 1 for firm-year observations 
with a FiTo score above the 75% percentile and zero otherwise (high creditworthiness). 
Where appropriate we include year and industry fixed effects in the regressions. We also 
control for Industry median leverage (debt specialization, debt maturity or debt granularity), 
which is measured as the median leverage (debt maturity, debt specialization or debt granularity) 
of all firms in the same 4-digit industry as the focal firm.  
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 4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample with all firm-year observations and for 
the startup subsample with first-year observations only. Table 1 shows that firms in the startup 
sample have higher leverage ratios, relative to firms in the entire sample. The high leverage ratios 
of startups are in line with recent findings of Robb and Robinson (2014) and Vanacker and 
Deloof (2015). In addition, firms in the startup sample tend to have a slightly more specialized 
debt structure, a higher debt maturity and a slightly lower debt granularity, relative to firms in the 
entire sample. However, these differences largely reflect changes in industry leverage, debt 
specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity, respectively. Founder-CEO departures are 
quite common and even in the first year of operation founder-CEOs leave their function in 5.5% 
of the startups.
9
 Founder-CEO deaths are rare events. Unsurprisingly, firms in the startup sample 
are smaller, exhibit lower profitability, have higher capital expenditures and are less 
creditworthy, relative to firms in the entire sample.  
*** Include Table 1 about here *** 
Table 2 shows the correlations between the dependent, independent and control variables, 
expect for industry and year dummies. The high correlations between the distinct debt policy 
variables (dependent variables) and their initial values (independent variables) already provide 
preliminary evidence that initial debt policies are important drivers of future debt policies. 
Multicollinearity is unlikely to unduly influence our subsequent results as variance inflation 
factors in all models (unreported) are well below the critical threshold of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004). 
                                                          
9
 Founder-CEO departures in the initial year of operation do not reflect bankruptcies in the initial year of operation. 
The founder-CEO departure variable does not get a value equal to 1 when a firm exits as a consequence of a 
bankruptcy or another event, because such an approach would mix firm exits with founder-CEO departures. 
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*** Include Table 2 about here *** 
 
4.2. The influence of initial debt policies on future debt policies 
We investigate the influence of initial debt policies on future debt policies by estimating the 
following ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
10
: 
  
                                 (5) 
 
where Yit is the debt policy (leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity or debt granularity, 
respectively) of firm i at time t; X is a set of previously identified capital and debt structure 
determinants that are lagged one year; Yi0 represents a firm’s debt policy in the initial year of 
operation (leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity or debt granularity, respectively); ν is a 
time fixed effect, and ε is a random error term. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
11
  
*** Include Table 3 about here *** 
For each dependent variable (leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity and debt 
granularity), we first estimate models in which the only independent variable is the initial debt 
policy. In models (a) (leverage), (d) (debt specialization), (g) (debt maturity) and (j) (debt 
granularity), the effects of initial debt policies on future debt policies are highly statistically 
significant and also economically significant. A one-standard deviation increase in a startup’s 
initial leverage (debt specialization, debt maturity or debt granularity) corresponds to an average 
                                                          
10
 Because the dependent variables are bounded above and below, we also used Tobit regressions as robustness 
checks. Results remain qualitatively similar. 
11
 We also perform the regression analyses by clustering both at the firm level and at the year level. By clustering on 
two dimensions simultaneously, it is possible to capture the unspecified correlation between observations on the 
same firm in different years and between observations on different firms in the same year completely in cases in 
which the time effect is not fixed (Petersen, 2009). The regression results remain qualitatively similar. 
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increase of 10.5% (6.7%, 6.3% or 15.1%) in future values of leverage (debt specialization, debt 
maturity or debt granularity).  
In models (b), (e), (h) and (k), we add year and industry fixed effects and variables that are 
consistently shown to be important capital and debt structure determinants (e.g., Brav, 2009; 
Colla et al., 2013). Adding the traditional determinants increases the adjusted R-squared for 
leverage from 17.7% in model (a) to 43.6% in model (b). While the coefficient of initial leverage 
becomes smaller when adding these additional variables, initial leverage still remains very 
important. After adding the traditional debt structure determinants, for debt specialization, the 
adjusted R-squared increases from 9.8% in model (d) to 12.9% in model (e), for debt maturity, it 
increases from 10.7% in model (g) to 22.6% in model (h), and for debt granularity, it increases 
from 19.9% in model (h) to 37.0% in model (k). While the influence of initial debt specialization, 
initial debt maturity structure and initial debt granularity choices decreases when adding 
additional variables, they remain economically very important determinants of the future debt 
specialization, debt maturity structure and debt granularity choices, respectively.  
Given our limited understanding of the effects of the traditional capital structure and debt 
structure variables on the debt policies in new entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Robb and Robinson, 
2014), it is also interesting to take a closer look at the coefficients of the control variables. Our 
findings on the traditional determinants of leverage are consistent with the capital structure 
literature. In line with Brav (2009) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), we find that firm size and 
tangibility are positively correlated with leverage, while profitability is negatively correlated with 
leverage. Consistent with the findings of Brav (2009) for private firms, firm growth is positively 
correlated with leverage. High creditworthy firms have lower leverage, relative to low 
creditworthy firms (Vanacker and Deloof, 2015). Finally, industry median leverage is positively 
correlated with leverage (Lemmon et al., 2008), although the correlation is economically modest. 
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For the effects of the traditional determinants on debt specialization choices, we find no 
relation between firm size and debt specialization (Colla et al., 2013). Firm profitability is 
negatively correlated with debt specialization, while we find a positive correlation between 
tangibility and debt specialization. The latter finding is in line with Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1996), who argue that firms with more easily redeployable assets will have a more specialized 
debt structure. Firm growth, capital expenditures and creditworthiness have an economically 
modest correlation with debt specialization. Industry median debt specialization is positively 
correlated with debt specialization. 
Turning to the effects of the traditional determinants of debt maturity structure, we find a 
positive correlation between firm size and debt maturity, which is consistent with the idea that 
smaller firms issue short-term debt to reduce agency problems (Smith and Warner, 1979). 
Profitability has a statistically significant negative impact on debt maturity. In line with Morris 
(1976), who argues that firms try to match the maturity of debt with the maturity of their assets, 
tangibility positively correlates with debt maturity. Surprisingly, firm growth is positively 
correlated with debt maturity, which contradicts evidence from more established private firms 
(Heyman, Deloof and Ooghe, 2008). Capital expenditures are also positively correlated with debt 
maturity. Creditworthiness and industry median debt maturity have an economically modest 
correlation with debt maturity.  
With respect to debt granularity, we find that larger firms have a tendency to spread out their 
debt maturity dates more. Profitability correlates negatively with debt granularity, while 
tangibility, firm growth and capital expenditures are positively correlated with debt granularity. 
These findings are in line with Choi et al. (2014) for public firms. The medium creditworthiness 
variable indicates that firms with medium creditworthiness spread out their debt maturity dates 
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more compared to firms with a low creditworthiness. Industry median debt granularity is 
positively correlated with debt granularity. 
We conduct two additional analyses to test for the robustness of our results. First, the effect 
of initial debt policies we find in table 3 might reflect an influence of initial values of the 
traditional capital and debt structure determinants on future debt policies. When this is the case, 
the influence of initial leverage (initial debt specialization, initial debt maturity and initial debt 
granularity, respectively) should disappear when the values of the initial traditional determinants 
are added. However, the results of models (c), (f), (i) and (l) in table 3 show that the initial debt 
policies remain significant when the initial determinants are added. This suggests that the effects 
of initial debt policies cannot be explained by the initial values of the traditional capital and debt 
structure determinants.  
Second, we test if the large average impact of initial debt policies on future debt policies (as 
shown in table 3) is driven by a large influence of initial debt policies during the early years in 
the firm’s life cycle, despite a minimal influence in the later years (e.g., DeAngelo and Roll, 
2015). To do this, we estimate equation 5 for a subsample in which we only retain the 
observations when firms are six years or older and a subsample in which we only retain the 
observations when firms are 11 years or older.
12
 Panel A of table 4 shows that firms’ debt 
policies in their initial year of operation remain statistically and economically significant 
determinants of future debt policies when we only retain the firm-year observations for which 
firms are six years or older. When we create a subsample in which we only retain the 
observations when firms are 11 years or older in panel B, the results remain qualitatively similar. 
While the influence of initial debt policies becomes smaller as firms age, they remain important 
determinants of entrepreneurial firms’ future debt policies. 
                                                          
12
 The coefficients of the control variables are not reported but are in line with those in table 3. 
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*** Include Table 4 about here *** 
In sum, our results show the existence of an important stable component in entrepreneurial 
firms’ debt policies. Indeed, initial debt policies, which are time-invariant factors, are one of the 
most important drivers of future debt policies even when we control for traditional 
contemporaneous determinants.  
 
4.3. The importance of firm-specific effects on debt policies 
Next, we analyze the importance of time-invariant, firm-specific factor(s) by conducting a 
variance decomposition of the debt policies. Specifically, we use the following equation: 
 
                                    
 
where η represents the firm fixed effect in the equation and all other variables as defined in 
equation (5). 
Table 5 reports the fraction of the total partial sum of squares of the respective model 
captured by each variable or effect. Panel A represents the results of the variance decomposition 
of leverage, while panels B, C and D report the results of the variance decomposition of debt 
specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity, respectively.  
*** Include Table 5 about here *** 
Models (a) of each panel, which include only firm fixed effects, explains 56.8% (40.9%, 
42.9% and 56.6%) of the total variation in leverage (debt specialization, debt maturity and debt 
granularity) of our sample. Models (b) show that the industry fixed effects do not explain much 
of the total variation in leverage (debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity). 
Similarly, the year fixed effects do not explain much of the total variation in the models as 
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depicted in models (c) and (d). These findings suggest that time-invariant factors account for the 
majority of variation in capital structures of new entrepreneurial firms. It also suggests that 
theories based on time-varying factors can offer only a rather incomplete explanation for the 
heterogeneity in capital and debt structures in a time-series study.  
Model (e) shows the results of equation (6) when using the traditional capital and debt 
structure determinants as previously specified. These variables are able to explain 30.6% (5.8%, 
18.4% and 28.5%) of the leverage (debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity) 
variation, which is much lower than the explanatory power of models (a), which simply include 
firm fixed effects.  
Adding firm fixed effects leads to a large increase in the adjusted R
2
 from model (e) to 
model (f) for all debt variables. For leverage, it increases from 30.6% to 71.2%, for debt 
specialization from 5.8% to 44.2%, for debt maturity from 18.4% to 51.8%, and for debt 
granularity from 28.5% to 64.3%.  
In sum, the results of the variance decompositions suggest that there is an important 
unobserved firm-specific factor that drives the debt policies of new entrepreneurial firms. This 
observation was also made by Lemmon et al. (2008) for leverage decisions, but our results 
suggest that this unobserved factor is already present at startup and affects a broader range of 
debt policies. This unobserved factor cannot be captured with traditional capital structure and 
debt structure variables.
13
 Second, most of the variation in the debt policies stems from cross-
sectional differences, as opposed to within-firm or time-series variation. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 In line with DeAngelo and Roll (2015), we also run additional models in which we include firm-time interactions. 
Although part of the explanatory power attributed to firm fixed effects is due to suppression of these interaction 
effects, firm fixed effects remain very important. 
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4.4. The influence of founder-CEO departures on the evolution of debt policies 
Our findings so far raise the question to what extent the stable component of entrepreneurial 
firms’ debt policies is determined by the founder-CEO. To investigate the impact of the founder-
CEO on debt stability, we estimate firm-fixed-effects regressions, which allow us to control for 
(stable) unobserved firm-specific factors. This is important because there might be other stable 
unobserved firm-specific factors in addition to the founder-CEO that drive entrepreneurial firms’ 
debt policies. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation:   
 
                                                      
                       (7) 
 
where Yit is the debt policy (i.e., leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity or debt granularity) 
of firm i at time t; X is a set of previously identified capital and debt structure determinants that 
are lagged one year; Founder-CEO Departure is a dummy that equals 1 from the year of the 
founder-CEO departure onward and 0 otherwise; Yi0 * Founder-CEO Departure represents the 
interaction between firm’s initial debt policy (i.e., initial leverage, debt specialization, debt 
maturity or debt granularity) and Founder-CEO Departure;
14
 ν is a time fixed effect, and ε is a 
random error term. Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. All models include firm and year fixed effects. 
*** Include Table 6 about here *** 
Models (a), (b), (c) and (d) of table 6 indicate that founder-CEO departures have a 
statistically significant positive impact on leverage, debt specialization and debt maturity, while 
they have a statistically significant negative impact on debt granularity. Hence, founder-CEO 
                                                          
14
 Note that the main effects of the initial debt policies are now absorbed in the firm fixed effects, which also control 
for any other unmeasured but stable firm characteristic that influences firms’ debt policies. 
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successors use more debt financing, particularly long-term debt financing, and have a less 
diversified debt structure (i.e., they use less debt sources and their debt maturity dates are less 
spread out).
15
 These findings are in line with the view that founder-CEOs can be relatively 
conservative in their financial decision-making (e.g., Ang, 1991).  
However, for the purpose of our study, we are primarily interested in the interaction between 
initial debt policies and founder-CEO departures. We expect this interaction, i.e. the coefficient w 
from equation 7, to be significantly negative. When the founder-CEO departs, the influence of the 
initial debt policies on the future debt policies significantly declines, relative to when the 
founder-CEO remains in function. Consistent with our expectation, models (a), (b), (c) and (d) of 
table 6 show that after the departure of the founder-CEO, the influence of a firm’s initial leverage 
(debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity) on future values of leverage (debt 
specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity) is 9.3% (3.9%, 3.3% and 5.7%) lower.
16
 These 
findings provide support for the view that founder-CEOs ―imprint their mark‖ on the debt 
policies of the firms they manage; as founder-CEOs leave their function the impact of initial debt 
policies on future debt policies decreases significantly. 
As Fee et al. (2013) note, the endogenous nature of CEO departures makes it difficult to 
determine whether policy changes after a change in a firm’s CEO are caused by the departure of 
the CEO, by a decision of the firm’s board or by another unobserved variable.17 Therefore, we 
                                                          
15
 Findings are confirmed in regression models without the interaction term between initial debt policies and founder-
CEO departures. However, the main effect of founder-CEO departure is no longer statistically significant in the debt 
specialization and debt granularity models. 
16
 When founder-CEOs depart during the earliest phase in the firm’s existence, they may not have had sufficient time 
to imprint their mark, or alternatively, their policies may not have been institutionalized yet. Consistent with this 
idea, unreported supplementary regressions confirm that founder-CEO departures more strongly decrease the effect 
of initial debt policies on future debt policies when founder-CEO departures happen during the first five (six or 
seven) years after founding relative to when they happen after the first five (six or seven) years after founding.  
17
 In our research context, it is unlikely that the policy changes after a change in a firm’s CEO are caused by a 
decision by a firm’s board because most of the firms in our sample do not have a board.  
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replace the founder-CEO departure dummy in equation 7 by a founder-CEO death dummy. 
Focusing on founder-CEO deaths allows us to examine the impact of exogenous founder-CEO 
departures on the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies. In this way, it is possible to 
investigate whether the decrease in importance of initial debt policies on entrepreneurial firms’ 
future debt policies after the departure of the founder-CEO is caused by CEO-style effects. If the 
style of founder-CEOs has an impact on the debt policies of new entrepreneurial firms, we would 
expect to find a decline in the importance of initial debt policies after exogenous founder-CEO 
departures.  
 *** Include Table 7 about here ***  
The results in table 7 using founder-CEO deaths confirm our results from table 6.  Founder-
CEO deaths increase firms’ leverage, debt specialization (although not statistically significant) 
and debt maturity ratios, while they lower the extent to which firms spread out their debt maturity 
dates across time. More importantly, we find in table 7 that after the founder-CEO dies, the 
impact of initial leverage, debt maturity and debt granularity on future leverage, debt maturity 
and debt granularity declines. The impact of initial debt specialization on future debt 
specialization also declines after exogenous founder-CEO departures, but this effect is not 
significant at traditional levels (p = 0.111). These results suggest that founder-CEOs imprint their 
mark on the debt policies of their firms, causing a stable component in entrepreneurial firms’ debt 
policies. However, firms change inertial debt policies after founder-CEO departures.
18
 
In sum, the regression analyses in this section show that entrepreneurial firms’ initial debt 
policies become less impactful for their future debt policies after the departure of the founder-
                                                          
18
 There are only 19 firms in our sample where the founder-CEO dies in the first 15 years after startup. This small 
number might lead to inefficiency in the estimation and unreliable point estimates. However, despite these problems, 
our results for founder-CEO death and its interaction with initial debt policy is consistent with the founder-CEO 
departure analyses. 
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CEO. These results suggest that one unobserved firm-specific factor that drives the debt policy 
decisions of new entrepreneurial firms is the founder-CEO. 
 
5. Alternative explanations and robustness checks 
We interpret our findings in the context of imprinting theory, which implies that founding 
decisions play an important role in imprinting firm characteristics that are perpetuated over time. 
However, there are some alternative explanations for our findings, which we discuss below. 
Detailed results of the robustness checks discussed below are available in the Internet Appendix. 
First, it is possible that the observed stability of debt policies at the firm level is driven in 
large part by low speeds of adjustment to moving target debt policies. To investigate this 
possibility, we run partial-adjustment models of firm debt policies and estimate the speed of 
adjustment of firms’ actual debt policies to their target debt policies (see Lemmon et al. (2008) 
for a similar approach). However, results are not consistent with this alternative explanation. 
Specifically, partial-adjustment models that include firm-fixed effects exhibit higher model fit 
and higher speeds of adjustment, relative to models without firm-fixed effects. Hence, time-
invariant, firm-specific factors drive target debt policies. Overall, our findings suggest that not 
only entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies but also their target debt policies contain an important 
stable component. 
A second alternative explanation for our findings is that it is the presence of the founder-
CEO in the firm rather than his/her preference for a particular debt policy that matters. A CEO 
change may have a large impact on the firm’s fundamental characteristics and access to external 
finance, and as a result affect its capital structure. Especially the prospects of new and small 
firms, like the ones we study, are often closely tied to founder-CEOs’ skills (Cooper, Gimeno and 
Woo, 1994), which implies that founder-CEO departures (deaths) may have a strong negative 
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impact on the firm’s future prospects. Furthermore, discontinued lending relationships after 
founder-CEOs departures (deaths) might increase adverse selection and moral hazard risks 
between firms and their lenders (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). If it is the 
simple presence of founder-CEOs in firms that matters, we therefore expect to find that founder-
CEO departures (deaths) decrease firm performance and increase the likelihood of going 
bankrupt. However, we find that firm profitability increases after the departure of the founder-
CEO, although the effect is economically very small. Founder-CEO deaths do not influence 
subsequent firm profitability. In addition, founder-CEO departures do not have a significant 
impact on the likelihood of going bankrupt, while founder-CEO deaths decrease the likelihood of 
going bankrupt. Thus, these additional tests contradict the argument that the simple presence of 
founder-CEOs is more important than founder-CEOs’ preferences for a particular debt policy. 
Third, firms characterized by higher levels of information asymmetry may not have access to 
debt financing and thus initially rely more on equity financing (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1998). As 
a result, the stability of debt policies might be stronger for firms characterized by lower levels of 
information asymmetry, while the debt policies of firms characterized by higher levels of 
information asymmetry might be more in line with the traditional information-based theories on 
the evolution of entrepreneurial financing. To test for this possibility, we distinguish between 
firms based on the level of information asymmetry. Specifically, we run separate regressions for 
startups founded in high-tech industries and startups founded in other industries. However, we 
fail to find significant differences in the relation between initial debt policies and future debt 
policies for both subsamples. These findings indicate that differences in the level of information 
asymmetry do not drive the stable component of firms’ debt policies. 
Fourth, we test for the possibility that the stable component of entrepreneurial firms’ debt 
policies is caused by firms that have already achieved their desired structure (or size) at startup 
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and, as a consequence, do not grow much in the next 15 years after startup. For this purpose, we 
compute the average yearly growth rate in total assets of each firm based on the entire period it is 
in the sample. Based on their average yearly growth rate in total assets, firms are sorted into four 
portfolios, i.e. firms with a low, medium, high and very high average yearly growth rate, 
respectively. We find that initial leverage, debt specialization and debt granularity exert less 
influence on future leverage, debt specialization and debt granularity for the firms with very high 
average yearly growth rates. However, even in the sample of firms with a very high average 
yearly growth rate, the initial debt policies remain an important determinant of future debt 
policies. Thus, irrespective of firm growth, initial debt policies significantly influence future debt 
policies.  
Fifth, we investigate whether our results are potentially driven by very small firms that may 
have limited operational activities but dominate the population of entrepreneurial firms (and our 
sample). Indeed, our sample firms employ on average about 6 employees and the median firm 
employs 3 people (all in full time equivalents). We analyze subsamples of firms with more than 
one (five and ten) employee(s) in the year of startup. The results based on these different 
subsamples remain quantitatively similar. Hence, the stable component of firms’ debt policies 
and the results of the founder-CEO departure analyses are not driven by the smallest firms.  
Finally, firms may leave the sample early either due to bankruptcies, acquisitions or buy-
outs. This may bias our results. To address this issue, we examine the subsample of survivors, 
i.e., the subsample of firms that are active in all sample years. The unreported results reveal that 
entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies still contain a stable component when we limit the sample to 
the firms that are active in all sample years.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper is the first to provide evidence on the evolution of a broad range of debt policies, 
including leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity policies, in 
entrepreneurial firms from startup. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset, based on the 
universe of Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998, which we track for up to 15 years 
after startup.  
We find that entrepreneurial firms’ leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity and debt 
granularity policies contain an important time-invariant, stable component that remains present in 
the 15 years after startup. Specifically, financing decisions at startup serve as strong predictors of 
future financing decisions, and this is the case even after controlling for the traditional 
contemporaneous capital structure and debt structure variables, such as firm size, profitability, 
tangibility and growth. This finding is in line with imprinting theory. Our findings further suggest 
that current capital structure and debt structure research is missing an important time-invariant, 
firm-specific factor(s) present from startup that drives the stable component of debt policies. Our 
results suggest that one important time-invariant, firm-specific factor is the founder-CEO. The 
influence of initial debt policies of entrepreneurial firms on future debt policies declines 
significantly after the departure (and death) of the founder-CEO.  
Our findings underscore the need for more research on financial decision making in very 
early stage firms that goes beyond the traditional capital structure and debt structure variables. 
We provide a fresh perspective to increase our understanding of financial decision making in 
early stage entrepreneurial firms—i.e., imprinting theory—and hope our paper will encourage 
others to study more fully the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies from startup.  
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Variables Definitions 
Leverage  total debt/total assets. 
Debt Specialization Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt usage that refers to the degree of debt specialization. HHI is equal to one when a firm only uses 
one type of debt, while HHI equals zero when a firm simultaneously uses all types of debt in equal proportion. 
Debt Maturity   the percentage of total debt that matures in more than five years. 
Debt Granularity  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt maturity that refers to the degree to which a firm spreads out its debt maturity dates across time. 
HHI is equal to one when a firm does not spread out its debt maturity dates across time, while HHI equals zero when a firm completely 
spreads out its debt maturity dates across time. This measure is multiplied by minus one so that higher values of debt granularity 
indicate that firms increasingly spread out their debt maturity dates. 
Initial Leverage (Debt Specialization, Debt 
Maturity and Debt Granularity) 
the value of leverage (debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity) at startup. 
Founder-CEO Departure a dummy variable that equals 1 from the year of the founder-CEO departure onward and 0 otherwise. 
Founder-CEO Death a dummy variable that equals 1 from the year of the founder-CEO death onward and 0 otherwise. 
Firm Size  ln(total assets). 
Profitability  EBIT/total assets. 
Tangibility   net PPE/total assets. 
Appendix A. Variable definitions 
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Firm Growth (total assets in year t – total assets in year t-1)/total assets in year in year t-1 
Capital Expenditures   new investments in fixed assets/total assets. 
Dummy Low (Medium and High) 
Creditworthiness   
a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms with a low (medium and high) creditworthiness and 0 otherwise. Firms are classified into three 
categories according to their FiTo score (i.e., a default risk indicator from Graydon―the market leader in commercial and marketing 
information as well as credit and debt management in Belgium). Firms with a low (medium and high) creditworthiness were taken to be 
those situated below the 25th percentile (those situated between the 25th and the 75th percentile; and those situated above the 75th 
percentile). 
Industry Median Leverage  
(Debt Specialization,  
Debt Maturity and Debt Granularity)   
the median leverage (debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity) of all firms in the same industry as the focal firm.  
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All firm-year 
observations 
First-year 
observations 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
  [Median]   [Median]   
Leverage 0.629 0.249 0.753 0.199 
 
[0.682] 
 
[0.808] 
 Debt Specialization 0.401 0.212 0.419 0.212 
 
[0.356] 
 
[0.373] 
 
Debt Maturity 0.096 0.203 0.128 0.269 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.000] 
 Debt Granularity -0.534 0.338 -0.555 0.340 
 
[-0.452] 
 
[-0.476] 
 Founder-CEO Departure 0.273 ― 0.055 ― 
 ―  ―  
Founder-CEO Death 0.002 ― 0.000 ― 
 ―  ―  
Firm Size 5.838 1.416 4.884 1.636 
 
[5.877] 
 
[5.050] 
 Profitability 0.063 0.108 0.049 0.121 
 
[0.043] 
 
[0.025] 
 Tangibility 0.303 0.255 0.322 0.258 
 
[0.240] 
 
[0.265] 
 Firm Growth 0.071 0.262 ― ― 
 
[0.010] 
 
― 
 Capital Expenditures 0.025 0.040 0.084 0.032 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.100] 
 Dummy Low Creditworthiness 0.247 ― 0.360 ― 
 ―  ―  
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness 0.485 ― 0.533 
 
 
― 
 
― 
 Dummy High Creditworthiness 0.269 ― 0.107 
 
 
― 
 
― 
 Industry Median Leverage 0.668 0.085 0.724 0.080 
 
[0.664] 
 
[0.724] 
 Industry Median Debt Specialization 0.355 0.052 0.362 0.055 
 
[0.344] 
 
[0.353] 
 
Industry Median Debt Maturity 0.005 0.047 0.015 0.080 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.000] 
 Industry Median Debt Granularity -0.612 0.162 -0.613 0.157 
 
[-0.596] 
 
[-0.599] 
 Number of Observations
19
 49,418  4,962  
                                                          
19
 The number of observations for debt specialization, debt maturity, debt granularity, industry median debt specialization, industry 
median debt maturity and industry median debt granularity equals 48,185 (all firm-year observations) and 4,853 (first-year 
observations), respectively. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 4,962 Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998 that are followed for up to 15 years after 
startup. The table presents the mean, median (in brackets) and standard deviations (SD) for the entire sample of all firm-
year observations and the subsample of new incorporations. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) Leverage 1.000 
                    
(2) Debt Specialization -0.047 1.000 
                   
(3) Debt Maturity 0.214 0.193 1.000 
                  
(4) Debt Granularity 0.298 -0.257 0.476 1.000 
                 
(5) Initial Leverage 0.419 -0.053 0.088 0.184 1.000 
                
(6) Initial Debt Specialization 0.012 0.312 0.076 -0.075 0.055 1.000 
               
(7) Initial Debt Maturity 0.109 0.058 0.327 0.281 0.235 0.144 1.000 
              
(8) Initial Debt Granularity 0.111 -0.093 0.203 0.446 0.297 -0.215 0.497 1.000 
             
(9) Founder-CEO Departure -0.090 0.019 -0.024 -0.046 -0.045 0.009 -0.020 -0.042 1.000 
            
(10) Founder-CEO Death -0.009 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 0.000 0.082 1.000 
           
(11) Firm Size 0.098 0.037 0.159 0.122 0.140 0.098 0.171 0.073 0.149 0.003 1.000 
          
(12) Profitability -0.294 -0.116 -0.106 -0.097 -0.040 -0.016 -0.046 -0.034 0.003 0.006 0.075 1.000 
         
(13) Tangibility 0.249 0.093 0.383 0.498 0.089 0.070 0.234 0.291 -0.024 -0.019 0.055 -0.173 1.000 
        
(14) Firm Growth 0.129 -0.004 0.040 -0.004 -0.053 -0.024 -0.070 -0.067 -0.022 -0.004 0.105 0.205 -0.019 1.000 
       
(15) Capital Expenditures 0.152 -0.008 0.079 0.114 -0.009 -0.029 -0.026 0.028 -0.087 -0.012 -0.075 -0.028 0.188 0.369 1.000 
      
(16) Dummy Low Creditworthiness 0.148 0.072 0.026 -0.005 -0.039 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 0.011 -0.007 -0.172 -0.619 0.094 -0.148 -0.001 1.000 
     
(17) Dummy Medium Creditworthiness 0.242 -0.013 0.087 0.141 0.128 0.011 0.069 0.071 -0.045 0.004 0.047 0.007 0.109 0.064 0.034 -0.528 1.000 
    
(18) Dummy High Creditworthiness -0.406 -0.055 -0.135 -0.156 -0.106 -0.006 -0.070 -0.073 0.055 0.005 0.125 0.602 -0.217 0.074 -0.080 -0.347 -0.588 1.000 
   
(19) Industry Median Leverage 0.149 0.005 0.042 0.017 0.070 0.015 0.017 0.029 -0.048 -0.024 -0.116 -0.078 0.086 0.010 0.091 0.056 0.060 -0.148 1.000 
  
(20) Industry Median Debt Specialization -0.037 0.168 0.046 -0.071 -0.055 0.162 0.034 -0.075 0.027 -0.019 0.090 0.001 0.062 0.001 0.002 0.011 -0.035 0.021 0.001 1.000 
 
(21) Industry Median Debt Maturity 0.029 0.030 0.059 0.019 0.006 0.042 0.041 0.019 -0.029 -0.005 0.015 -0.017 0.057 0.003 0.038 0.014 0.006 -0.029 0.055 0.065 1.000 
(22) Industry Median Debt Granularity -0.094 -0.041 -0.009 0.132 0.090 -0.026 0.077 0.172 0.104 0.013 0.120 0.002 0.130 -0.102 -0.174 -0.032 -0.051 0.073 -0.140 -0.110 0.007 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
The sample consists of 4,962 Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998 that are followed for up to 15 years after startup. All correlations with an absolute value equal or higher than 
0.010 are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
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Dependent Variable: Debt Policy Leverage Debt Specialization Debt Maturity Debt Granularity 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
Initial Debt Policy 0.105*** 0.087*** 0.093*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.044*** 0.052*** 0.151*** 0.104*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm Size 
 
0.041*** 0.066*** 
 
0.000 0.006 
 
0.024*** 0.045*** 
 
0.033*** 0.064*** 
  
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.006) 
Profitability 
 
-0.028*** -0.028*** 
 
-0.021*** -0.023*** 
 
-0.004*** -0.007*** 
 
-0.006** -0.009*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Tangibility 
 
0.028*** 0.047*** 
 
0.013*** 0.017*** 
 
0.058*** 0.069*** 
 
0.126*** 0.148*** 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.043*** 0.040*** 
 
0.003*** 0.003** 
 
0.016*** 0.016*** 
 
0.016*** 0.015*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Capital Expenditures  
0.011*** 0.006*** 
 
-0.004*** -0.005*** 
 
0.004*** 0.001 
 
0.019*** 0.013*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness  
0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
-0.002 -0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
0.023*** 0.021*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Dummy High Creditworthiness  
-0.062*** -0.059*** 
 
0.007** 0.006** 
 
-0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
0.006* -0.005 
 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Industry Median Debt Policy  
0.005** 0.003* 
 
0.017*** 0.015*** 
 
0.004** 0.003* 
 
0.020*** 0.023*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Initial Firm Size   
-0.038*** 
  
-0.007 
  
-0.029*** 
  
-0.042*** 
 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.006) 
Initial Profitability   
-0.012*** 
  
0.009** 
  
0.005* 
  
0.004 
 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.005) 
Table 3: The influence of initial debt policies 
The sample consists of 4,962 Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998 that are followed for up to 15 years after startup. Coefficients in all specifications are estimated using OLS. To 
facilitate the comparison of the coefficients, we standardize the independent and the control variables to have zero mean and unit variance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
computed robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%; 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Initial Tangibility   
-0.033*** 
  
-0.005 
  
-0.021*** 
  
-0.044*** 
 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.005) 
Initial Firm Growth   
0.011*** 
  
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
0.001 
 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.003) 
Initial Capital Expenditures   
0.000 
  
-0.006** 
  
0.001 
  
0.014*** 
 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.003) 
Initial Dummy Medium    
0.000 
  
-0.005 
  
0.002 
  
0.007* 
Creditworthiness   
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.004) 
Initial Dummy High    
0.003 
  
0.000 
  
0.002 
  
-0.003 
Creditworthiness   
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.005) 
Initial Industry Median   
0.004 
  
0.003 
  
0.003 
  
-0.008** 
Debt Policy   
(0.003) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.004) 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.177 0.436 0.460 0.098 0.129 0.133 0.107 0.226 0.244 0.199 0.370 0.388 
Observations 44,456 44,456 44,456 43,332 43,332 43,332 43,332 43,332 43,332 43,332 43,332 43,332 
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Dependent Variable Leverage Debt Specialization Debt Maturity Debt Granularity 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
Initial Debt Policy 0.086*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.120*** 0.073*** 0.082*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.114 0.367 0.390 0.047 0.093 0.096 0.044 0.199 0.216 0.124 0.347 0.361 
Observations 28,401 28,401 28,401 27,697 27,697 27,697 27,697 27,697 27,697 27,697 27,697 27,697 
 
 
Dependent Variable Leverage Debt Specialization Debt Maturity Debt Granularity 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
Initial Debt Policy 0.077*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.102*** 0.058*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.086 0.295 0.318 0.033 0.083 0.086 0.023 0.197 0.208 0.088 0.335 0.348 
Observations 12,364 12,364 12,364 12,097 12,097 12,097 12,097 12,097 12,097 12,097 12,097 12,097 
Table 4: The influence of initial debt policies based on subsamples 
The sample consists of 4,962 Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998. Coefficients in all specifications are estimated using OLS. To facilitate the comparison 
of the coefficients, we standardize the independent and the control variables to have zero mean and unit variance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
computed robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. The control variables included in the models, which are not reported in this table, 
correspond with those included in the corresponding models in table 3. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Subsample with observations when firms are six years or older 
Panel B: Subsample with observations when firms are 11 years or older 
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 Leverage 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Firm FE 1.000 . . 0.895 . 0.934 
Year FE . . 1.000 0.105 0.310 0.048 
Firm Size . . . . 0.229 0.007 
Profitability . . . . 0.035 0.002 
Tangibility . . . . 0.106 0.006 
Firm Growth . . . . 0.045 0.002 
Capital Expenditures . . . . 0.000 0.000 
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness . . . . 0.007 0.000 
Dummy High Creditworthiness . . . . 0.125 0.001 
Industry Median Leverage . . . . 0.006 0.000 
Industry FE . 1.000 . . 0.138 . 
  
 
    Adj. R² 0.568 0.043 0.093 0.645 0.306 0.712 
 
 
 Debt Specialization 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Firm FE 1.000 . . 0.998 . 0.993 
Year FE . . 1.000 0.002 0.017 0.001 
Firm Size . . . . 0.003 0.000 
Profitability . . . . 0.156 0.004 
Tangibility . . . . 0.126 0.000 
Firm Growth . . . . 0.010 0.000 
Capital Expenditures . . . . 0.035 0.000 
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness . . . . 0.000 0.000 
Dummy High Creditworthiness . . . . 0.015 0.000 
Industry Median Debt Specialization . . . . 0.149 0.000 
Industry FE . 1.000 . . 0.488 . 
  
 
    Adj. R² 0.409 0.035 0.001 0.410 0.058 0.442 
 
 
Table 5: Variance decomposition of debt policies 
The sample consists of 4,962 Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998 that are followed for up to 15 years after 
startup. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. Firm FE are firm fixed effects. Year FE are year fixed effects. 
Industry FE are industry fixed effects. Panels A, B, C and D present the results of the variance decomposition of leverage, 
debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity, respectively.  
 
Panel B: Debt Specialization 
Panel A: Leverage 
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 Debt Maturity 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Firm FE 1.000 . . 0.975 . 0.955 
Year FE . . 1.000 0.025 0.020 0.010 
Firm Size . . . . 0.097 0.010 
Profitability . . . . 0.001 0.000 
Tangibility . . . . 0.721 0.022 
Firm Growth . . . . 0.021 0.002 
Capital Expenditures . . . . 0.002 0.000 
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness . . . . 0.001 0.000 
Dummy High Creditworthiness . . . . 0.002 0.000 
Industry Median Debt Maturity . . . . 0.001 0.000 
Industry FE . 1.000 . . 0.135 . 
  
 
    Adj. R² 0.429 0.025 0.008 0.443 0.184 0.518 
 
 
 Debt Granularity 
Variable (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Firm FE 1.000 . . 0.987 . 0.939 
Year FE . . 1.000 0.013 0.027 0.017 
Firm Size . . . . 0.040 0.008 
Profitability . . . . 0.000 0.000 
Tangibility . . . . 0.778 0.035 
Firm Growth . . . . 0.001 0.000 
Capital Expenditures . . . . 0.007 0.001 
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness . . . . 0.010 0.000 
Dummy High Creditworthiness . . . . 0.001 0.000 
Industry Median Debt Granularity . . . . 0.014 0.000 
Industry FE . 1.000 . . 0.124 . 
  
 
    Adj. R² 0.566 0.043 0.002 0.575 0.285 0.643 
 
 
Panel D: Debt Granularity 
Panel C: Debt Maturity 
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Dependent Variable: Debt Policy Leverage 
Debt 
Specialization 
Debt 
Maturity 
Debt 
Granularity 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Firm Size 0.091*** 0.011*** 0.058*** 0.090*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Profitability -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.005*** -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Tangibility 0.039*** -0.002 0.039*** 0.100*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Firm Growth 0.037*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital Expenditures 0.005*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness 0.001 0.003** -0.002** 0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Dummy High Creditworthiness -0.025*** 0.004** -0.005*** -0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry Median Debt Policy -0.001 0.005*** 0.003** 0.010*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Founder-CEO Departure 0.097*** 0.036*** 0.019*** -0.040*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Initial Debt Policy * Founder-CEO Departure -0.093*** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.057*** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.720 0.449 0.508 0.652 
Observations 44,456 43,332 43,332 43,332 
Table 6: The influence of founder-CEO departure 
The sample consists of 4,962 Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998 that are followed for up to 15 years 
after startup. Coefficients in all specifications are estimated using Firm FE. To facilitate the comparison of the 
coefficients, we standardize the independent and the control variables to have zero mean and unit variance. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed robust to both clustering at the firm level and 
heteroskedasticity. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable: Debt Policy Leverage 
Debt 
Specialization 
Debt 
Maturity 
Debt 
Granularity 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Firm Size 0.093*** 0.012** 0.062*** 0.092*** 
 
(0.061) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Profitability -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.006*** -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Tangibility 0.038*** -0.001 0.039*** 0.101*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Firm Growth 0.038*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Capital Expenditures 0.005*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dummy Medium Creditworthiness 0.002 0.003* -0.002 0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Dummy High Creditworthiness -0.025*** 0.003 -0.005** -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Industry Median Debt Policy -0.001 0.005** 0.004** 0.008** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) 
Founder-CEO Death 0.031*** 0.003 0.002** -0.012*** 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Initial Debt Policy * Founder-CEO Death -0.029*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.716 0.446 0.500 0.649 
Observations 44,456 43,332 43,332 43,332 
Table 7: The influence of founder-CEO death 
The sample consists of 4,962 Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998. For 19 firms the founder-CEO dies as 
the firms are tracked for up to 15 years after startup. Coefficients in all specifications are estimated using Firm FE. 
To facilitate the comparison of the coefficients, we standardize the independent and the control variables to have 
zero mean and unit variance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed robust to both clustering 
at the firm level and heteroskedasticity. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%; 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
